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Abstract 
This paper will deal with why party funding regimes in established democracies differ. 
It examines the variation of funding in two ways: the new trend towards more public 
funding and the growing tendency for state intervention in party finance regulations. By 
using new, comprehensive data, it is hoped to contribute to the field of political finance. 
The data set is used with a large-n research strategy with a cross-sectional design on up 
to eighty-nine democracies. The empirical findings in this paper will demonstrate that 
the structure of the party funding regimes i.e. a country’s source of funding and its 
regulation to some extent depend on the electoral system and the political system. The 
result will show that when a country’s democratic institutional arrangement are 
characterised by a proportional electoral system with a presidential form of government 
it is more likely that it will use public funding as a source of money to political parties 
and have a higher amount of regulation on political finance. In addition, the age of a 
democracy appears to have had some impact on source of funding, but limited impact 
on the regulatory party funding regime.  
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1 Introduction  
James Kerr Pollock argued that: “the relation between money and politics has come to 
be one of the great problems of democratic government. Healthy political life is not 
possible as long as the use of money is unrestrained” (Pollock 1932: 328). Pollock 
concluded then what is as true today: that political finance has a crucial role in the 
political system. Since then, two major trends can be seen in political finance: direct 
public funding to parties has become normal in the political systems and political parties 
have developed from being seen as a threat to liberal democracy to becoming a 
requirement for the effective function of government of this tenure (Van Biezen 2008: 
349). Today, the state plays a dualistic function in relation to political parties: as a 
provider of funds and as a regulator. Pinto-Duschinsky’s research has argued that, 
despite the great variation in political finance between states, money in politics is an 
essential resource for the continued, effective functioning of both competitive 
democracies and their governments (Pinto-Duschinsky: 2002). This in turn raises 
questions as to the nature of the circumstances under which different types of party 
funding regime develops. Hypotheses about why this differs and its origins have not 
kept pace with the new emerging cross-sectional data on political finance, which 
provides an opportunity for the focus and analysis of this thesis (Van Biezen 2008: 
Scarrow: 2007).  
Political finance is a multifaceted political phenomenon and has in recent 
years attracted a growing interest in how parties and candidates are and ought to be 
financed due to successive waves of democratization, an increase in the complexity of 
the electoral systems and with a growing awareness of the risk of corruption (Casas-
Zamora 2005: 1). An increase in political finance regulation has generated evidence on 
difference regime patterns that has in turn given researchers new opportunities to 
explore the origins and explanations for different funding systems.  This general interest 
and fascination with money and politics have led to a global debate supported by 
governmental and non-governmental organizations such as: the Council of Europe, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and Transparency International (TI).  
Despite the existence of some research on the matter, political finance 
remains an area on which little systematic scholarly attention has been generated. The 
existing literature on the subject has a number of shortfalls. Research has as a start, been 
preoccupied with descriptive analysis with a focus on national details. Cross-national 
generalization has long been a problem, mainly, due to the lack of collected data and the 
parochial view of the area of political finance within the wider discipline of political 
science  (Koss 2008: 283; Casas-Zamora 2005: 3); partly, because of its lack of general 
agreed-on classifications given the wide range of funding and regulatory options. 
   
Recently, new data sets have emerged, the most comprehensive of which, has been 
developed by the non-governmental organization IDEA (2012). This new data set on the 
subject of political finance has enhanced its potential to increase the middle-range 
theories and to fulfil the procedure of carrying out statistical hypothesis tests (Scarrow 
2007: 195).  
What political parties do varies in different systems, in short, we can argue 
that parties do four things; parties are as mentioned the key actors in the operation of 
parliament and most individual representatives don’t have time to go in-depth on every 
issue whereas they vote as their party and follow their judgement, so even if they are 
individual candidates they fall back on their political party, parties recruit and socialize 
the political elite, parties provide a linkage between the civil society and the state, and 
parties aggregate interests and manifests (Gallagher 2012: 327). By looking at the 
political party as the most important actor in explaining the difference in party-funding 
regimes, this paper will try to outline how source of funding and regulation are created 
in the political system. 
If we are to identify the current research on party funding regimes, it can 
broadly be summoned in two ways: firstly, it emphasis different causal relationships. 
The emerging contemporary research developed from the first descriptive small-n 
studies on party funding have evaluated its possible effects in terms of corruption, 
public policy or the institutional change that parties have gone trough when 
transforming from private associations to semi-public entities. An evolutionary process, 
due to an increase in public funding: a transformation mostly recognized as the cartel 
party theory (Sachs: 2013; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman 2002; Van Biezen 2009; Katz 
& Mair: 1995).  By contrast, some scholars have made some attempts to outline its 
origins with hypotheses on why these party funding regimes differ (Heidenheimer: 
1963; Mulé: 1998): an approach that has been further developed by, the contemporary 
scholars, Michael Koss and Susan E Scarrow. Instead of treating party funding as the 
independent variable, i.e. studying the effects of party funding regime, it can be treated 
as the dependent variable i.e. studying the cause for party funding regime. With this 
approach, these researchers have started to develop a framework that incorporates other 
stands of political science literature (Koss 2008: 283; Scarrow 2004: 654). Secondly, 
most research on political finance has been covering and focusing on national and 
regional analysis, with some few exceptions (IDEA: 2012; Pinto-Duschinsky: 2002; 
Ohman: 2011).  
This paper will, as Koss and Scarrow, treat party funding regime as the 
dependent variable and have the ambition to provide important factors that can explain 
the cause of funding reform under which parties might become reliant on certain types 
of funding and regulation. This reversed method will give a better opportunity to 
incorporate other fields of study, like research on electoral -and political systems. In 
contrast to the scope of small-n studies, this paper will try to enrich the framework of 
political finance with a large-n research strategy occupied with the main goal to 
generalize possible findings.  
 
 
   
 
1.1 Purpose  
The purpose with this thesis is to better understand and explain why there is a variety of party 
funding regimes, which the phenomena of political finance seems to be creating. By carrying 
out different hypotheses on promising areas concerning the main institutional rules of 
established democracies, such as the organization and the operation of the political system. 
The hope is to integrate those theories with the research on political finance (Casas-Zamora 
2005: 3). A causal approach to party funding regimes may help us to understand the features 
of the regimes funding controls: a certain type of funding or regulation might prove to be 
workable in one country, but not meet the condition of another system.  
In a matter of fact, previous research hasn’t overlooked general assumptions on 
cause. The problem has been that lack of data that has led to research strategies with a small-n 
design, which has kept the hypotheses in the periphery of their work. New emerging global 
data should make it possible to take on a generalizing approach by tracing potential 
explanations as independent variables, which could give answers to why party funding 
regimes differ today. The interest lies in, at a very general level, identifying the similarities 
and differences among the established democracies in the analysis. This approach will have 
the ambition to bridge theory to empirical findings to enhance the under-theorized field of 
political finance (Scarrow 2004: 654).   
The subject is of great importance, since the different conceptions on the issue 
of funding leads, obviously, to different prescription on the appropriate legal funding and 
regulations of political parties, which raise questions on how they are financed and why. The 
position of the political parties plays a crucial role, in respect of funding and regulation, 
because the parties themselves are principal agents of their own regimes. (Von Biezen 2008: 
345). Given this, it is still very unlikely that this study will reveal universally explanations; 
optimistically it can recognize trade-offs between interests caused by certain factors in the 
political system that can increase and guide further studies on the subject.  
 
1.1.1  Research Question 
- How can we explain the variation in party funding regimes in established 
democracies? 
 
 
 
 
   
1.2 Outline 
The structure of this thesis will start with an overview of what is already known about the 
topic of political finance, what concepts and theories that have been applied, with what 
methods and the key contributors to its field. The theoretical overview will serve another 
important function: it will identify important variables that could explain why some countries 
make funding reforms and why some do not. The chapter of theory will work as a stepping-
stone for the formulation of hypotheses. The theory and the hypotheses will then guide the 
process of the gathering of relevant data that will be tested on the features of party funding 
regimes. The final chapter will conclude the results. Its main focus will lie on the generation 
of new knowledge, which can contribute and enrich the existing studies in this research field.  
   
2 Theory 
This theoretical overview will consist of two parts: it will first explain and build a conceptual 
framework of political finance and then precise the definition of party funding regime, as 
understood in this thesis. The second part will deduct hypotheses from the literature on 
political finance that scholar in political finance have started to develop, by using other stands 
of the political science literature. 
A framework, which the phenomena of political finance can be understood after is 
constructed with the political party as the central actor in the political system. This is a 
consequence due to the normalization of the political party during the 20th century. The 
political party, as being the central actor in the political system, is an actor whom alters the 
rules for themselves, and the internal affairs of the political parties could serve as a key 
difference to how the party funding regime in a country is structured.  
Key contributors, to the field of political finance argues that this field is under-theorized 
and is in immense need of more middle-range theories i.e. bridging a growing gap between 
theory and empirical findings in the attempt to understand and explain the limited aspect of 
political finance.  (Bryman 2012: 22). This chapter will try to approach this gap by 
incorporating the concepts of political finance with theories from the political science 
literature.    
2.1 Political Finance and Party Funding Regime: A 
Framework 
Political finance can most narrowly be defined as the money spent on an election and in the 
broadest term go beyond the financing of both the parties and the campaigns and also include 
money circulating within partisan newspaper and media, the political foundations of allies 
such as unions and the cost of political lobbying. Although, in this paper, the concept 
employed is party funding and its definition will be position in-between these two i.e. the 
political funding will be defined after both the financing of the campaigns and the overall cost 
for a party to maintain permanent office (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002: 69-71).   
Since political finance is an extremely complex political phenomenon it is 
important to clarify how it has been defined in previous research and what areas that is 
included in the concept of party funding regime and most important, clarify how it will be 
defined in this thesis. When looking at existing ideas and empirical implications, funding has 
not one distinct definition that includes its many channels of money circulating in the political 
landscape. In an ambition to generalise, the definition of party funding could be in danger of 
conceptual stretching, which means that a broad interpretation of the concept could deplete 
   
the value of the result. The question lay in what the inquiry is a case of and what literature 
that is used and applied to answer it. The bottom line is that the same subject could be 
researched from different perspectives and in this analysis the perspective will primarily be on 
what variables in the political system that creates variation in party funding regimes, carried 
out with a large-n research method (Sartori 1970: see Teorell & Svensson 2012: 237). 
Public funding, as a source of money to the political parties, has increased 
during 20th century: a trend that has been outlined by Ohman, see Figure 1. The increase of 
public funding is a trend that historically has been described as a result of the interest of the 
party. Heidenheimer (1963) described that the general picture of party organisations could be 
divided into two polar models on how political parties are financed: mass party and cadre-
party. The mass-party model is dependent on funding from members and their goal is to 
remain the same status while the cadre-party model is dependent on large-scale contributors. 
Cadre-parties attempts to turn themselves into membership parties, when this evolution began 
it led to the cadre-parties change of source of funding, which started the diversification of the 
funding system. Today this have started to change, when public funding has been introduced 
in more countries, the old models of mass-party and cadre-party generalizations are becoming 
less significant, which have made room for the cartel party theory. The cartel party theory 
describes the interest of a party as less reliant on memberships and therefor turns to the state 
for funding (Katz & Mair: 1995). The move away from the mass-party model has been 
accounted as a change of funding patterns  (Hopkin: 2004). This link is still uncertain, when 
so many factors influence political competition: Nassmacher & Nassmacher argues in the 
opposite to Katz & Mair that public funding is a consequence of the decline of memberships 
and increased need for professionalism (2002).  
 
Figure 1. Increase in public funding as a source of funding in the world during the 20th 
century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ohman (2011)  
   
Walking alongside the conceptual ladder of political finance (1), see figure 2, party funding 
regime (2), the dependent variable, will be measured after two empirical indicators (3) sources 
of money and (4) Regulations. Party funding regime is originally a term that is derived from 
the theoretical concept of ‘Institutional regimes’ that defines party funding regimes after three 
areas: the legitimate sources of income for the political parties, their legitimate areas of 
spending and the extent to which parties have to publicly declare the income and expenditures 
(Casas-Zamora 2005:17). In this thesis, the legitimate areas of spending and the extent to 
which parties have to publicly declare the income and expenditure are measured together and 
are referred to as regulations in order to make two ideal models of party funding regimes: 
countries that have public funding and they who have not and those who regulate and 
countries that do not.  
When creating the concept of party funding regime, no difference is made 
between parties and candidates. It can still be discussed whether parties and candidates can be 
included in the same concept without being conceptually stretched. Helle for instance, 
motivates the consolidation by claiming it to be a matter of contextual difference rather than a 
conceptual problem and this thesis is evoking on that same idea (Helle 2011: 5).  
The early examination of sources of funding, made by Heidenheimer, gave 
evidence to a trend of diverse funding among political parties (Heidenheimer: 1963). Today, 
Pinto-Duschinsky claims after his global review: first, public funding has become normal; 
Second, the funding provided varies greatly; Third, since public funding is so wide it’s hard to 
say if funding has increased or decreased; Finally, the impact of public funding in terms of 
corruption seems to have a smaller value than either proponent or critics where expecting 
(Pinto-Duschinsky 2002: 79-81). 
The typology of source of money consists of several classifications, since 
scholars studying political finance haven’t agreed on a limited vocabulary for comparative 
purpose, instead several classifications exists in abundance. Byeme (1985) typology is one of 
the first and most frequently used. In Byemes classification, internal funding includes: dues, 
donations, contributions and funds generated by party members, office holders and party 
enterprises; the external funding include donations from non-members, firms, unions and 
other organizations; state support are classified as both direct and in-direct subsidies. Other 
used classifications are Nassmacher who have distinguished between grassroots, plutocratic, 
public and graft funding (2001). Casas-Zamora has distinguished private, public and 
illegitimate sources of funding (2005) and Hopkins have classified it as clientilistic, external 
elite, internal elite and cartel funding (2004). Byemes model of internal, external and public 
funding is used for the conceptual framework. However, external and internal sources of 
money are fields without global covered statistics: the tools of regulations will instead cover 
these areas. Even if political parties are seen as necessary in the political system, they are still 
one of the least trusted democratic institutions, which give reasons for monitoring their 
effectiveness (Van Biezen 2008: 338). There is no shortage of bans and disclosure laws in 
party funding: by the mid-1990s all established democracies had some regulations on party 
funding (Scarrow 2004: 654). The conceptual framework of political finance, built in Figure 
2, could also be treated two-dimensional, since party-funding regimes in terms on how they 
are financed and how they are regulated can differ between the electoral campaign period and 
   
their general office holding, but as mentioned in the beginning: the purpose of this paper is to 
cover both dimensions. 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Framework on Political Finance as understood in this paper.  
 
 
 
Note: Based on the interpretation of Pinto-Duschinsky’s definition of political finance (2002), 
Casas-Zamora (2005) view of a party-funding regime and Byemes classification of sources of 
money (1985). 
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2.2 Variations in Party Funding Regimes  
Going back to the research question: how can we explain the variation in party funding 
regimes in established democracies, or more specific: what makes sources of money and 
regulations differ between countries. This part will deduct hypotheses from the literature on 
political finance in an attempt to incorporate other fields of study in the literature of political 
science, such as the electoral system, political system and discourse of democratization. These 
different areas are in line with what previous research have shown to be of value for the cause 
of variation in the field of political finance. Some researchers have begun to trace the origin 
of party funding regimes, which have been the first large strokes of integrating the area of 
political finance with other existing theories in field of political science. The theoretical 
framework that has been starting to develop suggests several potential hypotheses. 
Heidenheimer (1963) offered hypotheses on reasons for variation in spending patterns: the 
electoral system where seen as one important variable. Others have been Koss (2008) arguing 
for electoral system, party interest and political context, while Scarrow (2004) mainly have 
focused on party competition. By building on this research, which on one side has been 
occupied with small-n strategies, this research will try to translate those into a large-n strategy 
and find comparable data on a large number of cases in order to find relevant 
operationalizations on the hypotheses. The hope is that the source of funding and regulations 
can unveil systematic patterns on what type of party funding regime different factors in the 
political system creates.  
The material from the International IDEA database shows that regulation is as 
extensive in countries rated as ‘free’ as they are in countries rated as ‘not free’, which shows 
that the level of freedom and democracy seems to be a poor predictor of type of party funding 
regime: there seems to be no connection between the level of freedom and the probability that 
the regime will apply direct public funding or regulation to political parties (Ohman 2011: 
16). If the level of democracy is of no value on the outcome of party funding regime, Koss 
argues that the political discourse is an important factor and a trigger of party funding reform. 
If discourse in this sense is understood in terms of the democratic ideal at the time when a 
democracy was established, rather than after its level of democracy, could that have an impact 
on the way it is created? If that is the case, it should be easier for a new democracy to both 
having the ambition to establish a democracy with public funding, which appears to be on the 
democratic agenda and having a newly adopted political system, not directly generated with 
trust, would then employ more regulations concerning bans, limits and disclosure. As an 
example, post-communist countries have been proven to have parties with low trust and weak 
links with the civil society. Parties come and go quickly too, which makes it hard to talk about 
a system. This is explained to be a reason of political parties to be created top-down after 
1989 and because they did not, as many other western countries, emerge form social forces in 
the society (Gallagher 2012: 333). Furthermore, Van Biezen has showed some similarities and 
some difference among old and new democracies focusing on European countries. She 
explained that the similarities between the European democracies were that the countries with 
public funding also had a system of regulation. Van Biezen also argued that the increase in 
regulation had preceded the increase in public funding in those countries. And what divided 
   
them was that the new democracies in Europe had more regulations than old democracies: 
(Van Biezen 2008: 342).  Could the same conclusion be drawn on the established democracies 
in the world?  
In order to operationalize factors that can determine the likeliness of party 
funding reform, these are picked after the potential impact it could have on the structure of the 
political parties, which is the most important actor of party funding reform. Studies have 
demonstrated that funding reforms hardly can be examine separately form other institutional 
reforms; in terms of constitutional engineering it could in many way be seen as a variety of 
attempts to alter the rules of party competition. The electoral systems are often being 
separated after how it elects representatives to the parliament and are often classified as either 
a majoritarian system or a proportional system. In short, majoritarian systems use single-
member district methods, while proportional system use proportional representation. Other 
demarcation lines in this respect are different electoral formulas and district magnitudes 
(Lijphart 2012: 130-1). Research on political corruption conducted by Kunicova and Rose-
Ackerman has shown that the effect of electoral rules in democratic systems has impacts on 
the outcome:  proportional representation systems are more prone to corruption than 
majoritarian systems. In addition, proportional representation is worsening under presidential 
systems (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman: 2002). If that research result holds empirically, then 
we would expect the regulation to be more built-out, if a party funding regime has a 
proportional electoral system and a presidential form of government. - Considering that Pinto-
Duschinsky (2002) is arguing that regulation usually is a response to corruption scandals.  
The relationship between the executive and legislative branches’ of government 
is in the comparative literature classified as either presidential or parliamentary forms of 
government.  The difference between the form of government can be described in three ways: 
in parliamentary systems the executive need the legislatures confident in opposite to the 
presidential system where the president is constitutional assigned; the second difference is 
that in presidential systems the president are popularly elected while in parliamentary systems 
the head of state is negotiated without formal election; and the last difference is that 
presidential systems have on-person executives when parliamentary systems have collegial 
executives. (Lijphart 2012: 106-7). Political accountability has extensively been discussed as 
an important factor to generate good governance. The argument is that accountability allows 
for the punishment of politicians and that the possibility for this is determined by specific 
feature of the political system such as: competition in the political system, checks and balance 
and transparency. Parliamentary systems allow for a stronger and more immediate monitoring 
of the executive by the legislature because in this case parliament have the power to remove 
politicians from executive office, if not a single party have a single-majority. A separation of 
powers creates mechanism to police and punish government officials that misbehave 
(Lederman 2005: 5-6).   
During the 50s Duvergers framed the theory on how the election system affects 
the number of parties i.e. SMP produce two-party systems and PR list produce multi-party 
systems. Scarrow predicts that electoral competition is strongest in a two-party competition 
where it is easier to demand accountability (Scarrow 2004: 658). In a democratic system one 
accepted generalization about party funding reforms is made, it states that a rule should reflect 
the interest of the party or parties that holds office. The character of the party competition is 
   
conditioned by a particular constellation of political parties that differs between any given 
country. This political division is created from history and have developed from several 
cleavages creating a frozen state of party politics since 1920s (Lipset & Rokkan 1967; see 
Gallagher 2012: 289). Party systems can be seen as frozen; as a consequence of the constrains 
by the electoral system and its funding (Gallagher 2012: 315). Studies of electoral system 
have suggested that most parties likely to support ‘principle’ reforms, which is likely to 
decrease the power of the ruler, is in fact small opposition parties (Geddes 1991; see Scarrow 
2004: 654). At all levels of the political system, the party system and the structure of the 
opposition are of major importance for the functioning. With Geddes argument we would 
have to presume that the competition in the political system have to be high i.e. have a strong 
opposition to create some kind of reform capacity towards change of source of funding in 
terms of public funding and regulations. Just as Koss hypotheses on policy-, vote- and office-
seeking strategies for parties, Scarrow (2004) argues that regulation on party funding are 
structured to help a country’s strongest parties. Scarrow defines, instead of Koss three-variant, 
the structure in two ways as either revenue maximizing or as a electoral economy. If we 
assume that parties want to maximize its overall revenue or have short-term electoral success: 
the first view explains why economically healthy parties are willing to enhance their revenues 
like cartel parties and the second view explains why parties which have good private support 
are reluctant to public financing and that’s why many opponents to public subsidies have been 
conservatives. If the party competition is high it is likely that the government in office not to 
push trough reforms that only is in favour for themselves if they once could be in opposition. 
Therefor, party-funding reform would be more likely to occur when the political system have 
a strong opposition. When we talk about the element that defines the party system we don’t 
only talk about the effective number of parties but also the size of the competing parties.  
To summon it seems like the arrangement of the established democratic 
institutions: the interest aggregation and the political culture during a countries 
democratization age are important variables in the search for the explanation of variation in 
party funding regimes. In the light of the deducted hypotheses, a remake can be made on the 
impact democratic institutions have on each other: the majoritarian system favours a two-
party system; favours a presidential system and that a large disproportionality decreases the 
effective number of political parties. These circumstances are taken into account in the 
concluding chapter discussing the statistical result, but will be treated separately in the test of 
hypotheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
2.2.1 Hypotheses 
H1 Party funding regimes with public funding are more regulated. 
 
H2 The electoral system: proportional, mixed-member proportional or majoritarian systems 
have effect on the party-funding regime: Proportional systems employ public funding to a 
larger extent hand are more regulated.  
 
H3 The political system: presidential systems employ public funding and have more 
regulation than parliamentary systems do.  
 
H4 The democratic system: Young established democracies employ public funding to a larger 
extent and have more regulations than old established democracies, since the democratic 
context has an impact on the implementation process.  
 
 
2.3 Limitations 
This thesis is limited to established democracies. There are a number of indices of democracy 
formulated in different ways both in concept and methodology. However, Freedom House 
Index is used as a measurement because it is widely used in the subject of political finance. 
The consequence of this choice leaves some patterns of regional diversity: countries rated as 
free are most dominant in western Europe were all 24 states are rated as free, also 11 
countries in east-central Europe and 22 countries in the Americas and 18 in the Asia-Pacific 
region. A less significant level of freedom can be found in Africa where only 9 out of 53 
countries are included and in the Middle Eastern where only one country is included.  For a 
detailed description of countries included in the statistics, see Appendix 1.  
Even if a lot of countries in the world are removed with this limitation and, in 
fact, that the International IDEA database confirms that both ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’ 
countries have political finance regulation; such a global view could still be of some value 
when portraying large strokes on similarities and differences in the world. The argument for 
the limitation in this thesis is still inducing on the fact that, political finance is a field, when in 
fact the principal regulate itself. This circumstance makes the “not free” and “partly free” 
countries to be of great risk of unreliable data especially in countries rated as “not free”. 
Furthermore, there is a wide range of data sets on the independent variables concerning 
established democratic countries and these are therefor more suitable to test hypotheses on 
and are more adequate as a group to make generalisations on, when it comes to the structure 
of the political system.   
The dependent variable, party funding regime, will be measured after source of 
funding and with a regulation index. The measurements are created from an interpretation of 
   
Casas-Zamora’s previous definition of party funding regime and the measurement are tapped 
from question from the International IDEA database on up to eighty-nine countries. 
 In the conceptualization of party funding regime, the choice has been to include 
both parties and candidates and weather to threat the party funding regime both during the 
campaign period or only evaluate the party funding regime when they hold office. Firstly, a 
separation of parties and candidates could be effective when studying money as spending per 
see, especially in countries with intraparty competition like Japan, Ireland, Brazil and 
Belgium (Scarrow 2007: 200), but less when studying the cause of party funding regime 
quantitatively, since the main goal with a large-n design is to generalize rather than generating 
detailed descriptions. Secondly, the same argument holds for the inclusion of both a party’s 
funding during election and the period where they have to hold office: the intention is to cover 
the overall funding and regulation. 
2.4 Data  
In this section the concepts from the chapter on theory will be operationalized into measurable 
variables collected from statistical databases. When the employed concepts in this large-n 
research strategy are being measured they are formed into independent and dependent 
variables. The variables will be used in the research method for the estimation of the 
relationship between up to eighty-nine democracies. The requirements for the data is that it is 
suppose to frame what the variables really should measure i.e. have as high reliability and 
validity as possible. To sustain those requirements, the main criteria for the selection of data is 
to use a well-known source that corresponds well with what is being measured and analysed 
in order to answer the research question. The cases included in the large-n strategy rely on the 
Freedom House index, which is a well-known measure for level of democracy and freedom. 
The index is frequently used in previous literature on the topic of political finance.  
Indicators for a party funding regime will be direct public funding and a 
regulation index. This material is picked from the International IDEA database on political 
finance originally created in 2003 and re-made in a new updated edition for 2012, which is the 
year used in this paper. The International IDEA database is one of the first materials that 
covers as many countries and as many questions on the subject of political finance today and 
there is no competing source to be found that measures the same range of political finance 
questions. 
Data used for the independent variables of the institutional structure of the 
political system are taken from Gothenburg University Quality of Government (QoG) 
Standard Database. This database is a collection of databases that concerns issues of 
governments. The choice of the independent variables used from this standard database is 
further described in the method chapter.   
   
3 Choice of Methods 
The biggest methodological decision is usually described as the choice between the 
quantitative and qualitative research design or what is also currently described as a decision 
between a small-n and a large-n design. For many scholars this distinction has different 
epistemological foundations. From that distinction, the choice of research strategy has 
different intrinsic trade-offs concerning its relationship with validity and reliability that needs 
to be acknowledged as important criteria’s for the research process (Bryman 2012: 35). As 
mentioned before, much of the previous research in the field of public funding has been 
conducted with a qualitative or small-n research strategy, since the field of party funding have 
been a field without large amounts of reliable data. In the absence of available data on 
political finance it have been hard to test relevant hypotheses and to generalize, because 
results from small-n research is seen to be limited when it comes to generalisations. Now, new 
data from the International IDEA database offers a large amount of statistics on both many 
cases and on a wide range of questions. This development gives a great opportunity to move 
to a large-n research strategy, which Heidenheimer stated as well as an opportunity as soon 
more statistics was available (Heidenheimer 1963: 793). Even if statistical material from the 
official stories can be viewed with some kind of scepticism, in a cross-sectional perspective 
where big strokes of difference and similarities are more important than details, it’s of less 
important (Scarrow 2007: 206).  
 
The International IDEA database enables a cross-sectional research design and lends itself to 
the formal testing of hypotheses, when a hypothesis is to be tested, a relationship holds 
between the dependent variable of party funding regimes and the independent variables of 
possible explanations. Variables are essentially measured at a shallow level, explaining to 
some degree of confident that some relationship exist between variables, but it doesn’t mean 
that it will give us the whole nature of the relationship, which is why scholars argues for a 
mixed-method approach, putting epistemological and ontological beliefs to the side for a more 
pragmatic approach (Bryman 2012: Ch. 27). The use of a large-n research strategy, in this 
thesis, will then serve as a good addition to the big scope of already conducted small-n studies 
on the subject. The selection of a large-n research strategy also have great effects on the 
ability to ascribe causality to the findings, but cross-sectional design have an ambiguity about 
the direction of causal influence in data concerning variables: in the way that we can’t say 
what variable that precedes the other, instead we have to assume that one cause the other. 
Instead, it will infer on the theoretical idea on the proceeding likeliness. (Bryman 2012: 175-
76). The relationship between theory and empirical findings are studied with a cross-sectional 
design. The indicators on the dependent variable, party funding regime, are tested on the 
deduced hypotheses that have created a set of independent variables. The choices of variables 
from other stands of the political science literature are considered as important aspects and 
   
mentioned i previous research on political finance. Inferring on the previous hypotheses 
conducted with small-n research methods, this will have one impact on the transformation to a 
large-n method conducted in this paper: without time-series on the dataset of party funding 
regimes the thesis wont explain the evolution of the variation in party funding regimes, but on 
the variation we can see in the political system today. 
When the dependent and independent variables are determined, the next step in the 
research process takes place. Methods of bivariate analysis are used to trace the potential 
relationship between two variables at a time. The analysis is examining a variation in one 
variable that coincides with the variation in another variable. When we speak of a relationship 
or a correlation between variables, it explains whether the correlation is positive or negative, 
or possible none at all. The goal with the choice of analysis is to show if there is a statistical 
relationship between variables that can explain the variation of funding regimes we 
experience today  (Bryman 2012: 339).  What method to use in the bivariat analysis depends 
on the type of variable: for the description of the relationship between variables in this 
research: crosstabs, contingency tables and scatter plots are used.   
3.1 Independent Variables 
The independent variables serve as a guideline for the material. The choice of independent 
variables is operationalized after the hypotheses from the chapter on theory: 
 
• Years of Democracy (t_demyrs): Years of democracy are supposed 
to describe the discourse of values and trends that a particular time, 
when a political system emerged, represents. Years of democracy are 
measured as in an interval describing the number of consecutive years 
since 1930 the system has been democratic, as of 2000. The variable is 
computed into a dichotomous variable in the analysis when it is to be 
tested with the variable of public funding. The computed variable is 
divided after two democratic waves that occurred during the 70 years 
in the material: 1930 – 1980 and 1980 – 2000 (Ohman 2012: 5-6).  
• Electoral System Type (gol_est): The electoral system is measured 
nominally after the three basic types of electoral systems: majoritarian, 
proportional and mixed.  
• Regime Type (dpi_system): Regime type is a nominal measure after 
presidential, strong president elected by assembly and parliamentary 
regime.  
• Electoral Formula (gol_pr): Electoral formula used in an electoral 
tier. 
 
 
 
   
3.2 Dependent Variable 
The central concept in this paper is party funding regime and the purpose with its definition is 
to frame the variation of political finance we can perceive in a given country. It is already 
stated that public funding has started to become normal and that regulation has increased. The 
concept of party funding regime will be two-dimensional and include the source of funding, 
which will be measured by direct public funding and the amount of regulation measured with 
a regulation index. Together these two indicators will portray different outputs of type of 
regime as either a regime with public funding or without and a regime with high regulatory or 
low regulatory rules of funding. The independent variables will be tested on each indicator of 
the party funding regime separately in order to distinguish the possible significance each 
hypothesis have on each dimension. Source of funding will focus on public funding, which is 
the type of funding that many scholars have argued to be the most growing type of funding 
during the 20th century and appears to have caused most systematic change to the political 
parties, theoretically.  
 
Source of funding 
• Direct public funding (Idea_pfp): public funding to political parties is measured 
with a dichotomous variable that only answers wheatear public funding exist of if 
it’s not.  
 
Regulation Index 
• Ban on Anonymous Donations to Candidates (idea_bdac) 
• Ban on Corporate Donations to Candidates (idea_bdcc) 
• Ban on Trade Union Donations to Candidates (idea_bdtc) 
• Ban on Government Corporate Donations to Candidates (idea_bdgcc) 
• Limit on Donation to Candidate (idea_ldc) 
• Limit on Candidate spending (idea_lsc) 
• Ban on Anonymous Donations to Political Parties (idea_bdap) 
• Ban on Corporate Donations to Political Parties (idea_bdcp) 
• Ban on Trade Union Donations to Political Parties (idea_bdtp) 
• Limit on donation to Political Parties (time-period and campaign) 
(idea_ldp)(idea_ldpc) 
• Limit on Political Parties Spending (idea_lsp) 
• Ban on Government Corporate Donations to Political Parties (idea_bdgcp) 
• Bans on other form of Donations (idea_bdo) 
• Information from Political Parties and Candidates have to be made Public 
(idea_rip) 
• Political Parties and Candidates have to reveal identity of donors (idea_rdid) 
• Candidates and have to Report their Finances (Campaigns)(idea_frcc) 
• Political Parties have to Report their Finances (regularly and 
campaigns)(idea_frpr)(idea_frpe) 
   
4 Results 
In this body of research, the chapter on result will be presented after the two-dimensional 
concept of party funding regime. The statistical result will describe and outline the 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variables. The relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variables will be tested separately in 
order to distinguish likely diverse patterns. This chapter will start off by presenting the 
relationship between the dependent variables of electoral system, political system and the age 
of democracy and the independent variable of public funding. The second part will further 
show the relationship between the same dependent variables and the regulation index. Even if 
threated separately, it is still clear that there are a positive relationship between public funding 
and regulation. The observation Van Biezen made on European democracies seems to hold 
for the democratic countries in the world: The relation between the use of public funding in 
democracies and amount of regulation between sixty-nine established democracies has a 
positive Pearson correlation of ,0548, significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
4.1 Public Funding  
Describing the features of the eighty-nine democratic party-funding regimes today: 64 (71,9 
%) countries employ public funding to political parties and 25 (28,1%) employ no public 
funding to the political parties. How these countries vary in terms of how its democratic 
institutions are built concerning the electoral system differs in any given country. We can 
conclude that 28 countries (31,5 %) are majoritarian, 41 (46,1 %) are proportional and 13 
(14,6 %) are mixed in the statistical material. How the electoral system is related to the source 
of funding is clear. The electoral system type does show a certain pattern when it comes to the 
extent it employs public funding. Countries with a proportional or a mixed electoral system 
type employ public funding to a greater extent than the majoritarian. 92,2 % of the 
proportional systems and 92,3 % of the Mixed-systems use public funding as a source of 
funding. Majoritarian systems in the opposite only employ public funding in about a third of 
its cases see Figure 3.  The relationship between the type of electoral system and the source 
of funding can be traced down and also be described and be divided after the electoral 
formula: systems that use Hare quota or D’Hondt formulas use public funding in a larger 
extent than system that employ Single-Member-District-Plurality (SMDP).  
Type of political system, is divided into 24 (33,3 %) countries with presidential 
systems, 3 (4,2 %) with an assembly-elected president and finally 44  (62 %) countries with a 
parliamentary system. The result in Figure 4 shows that most countries that has a presidential 
   
system applies public funding, more precisely 91,7 % of the cases, while around two thirds of 
the assembly-elected president and the parliamentary system applies it.   
 
Figure 3: Wheatear a country with a certain electoral system type employ public funding or 
not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n=82 
 
Figure 4: Wheatear a country with a certain political system type employ public funding or 
not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n=71 
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Table 1. Years of democratization after two waves of democratization 
Direct Public 
Funding 
Old 1930 - 1980 New 1980 - 2000 
Total 
Yes 34 (70,8 %) 21 (91,3 %) 55 (77,5 %) 
No 14 (29,2 %) 2 (8,7 %) 16 (22, 5 %) 
Total 48 (100 %) 23 (100 %) N=71 (100 %) 
 
Public funding in relation to the number of years a country have been a democracy, separated 
after an old and a new wave of democratization, are demonstrated in Table 1. The table 
described the amount of democracies that have public funding after its democratic age. The 
old democracies, established between 1930 – 1980, use public funding as a source of funding 
in 70,8 % of the cases while the new democracies, established between 1980 – 2000, use it in 
91,3 % of the cases. The results shows that the age of an established democracy, if old, then 
the probability is higher for it not to be using public funding as a source of money than if the 
democracy is newly established.  
4.2 Regulation  
The regulation index, it contains sixty-nine countries with a value ranging from 0,05 to 1,16 
with a mean of 0,5706 and standard deviation of 0,30988. The relation between the regulation 
index and the electoral system and political system can be viewed in Table 1 and Table 2. 
The tables are bivariat analysis comparing the means of different types of systems. 
 
Table 2. Relation between the regulation index and the electoral system type 
Electoral System Type  N Mean Std. Deviation  
Majoritarian 19 ,4100 ,30768 
Proportional 35 ,6120 ,29666 
Mixed 13 ,7166 ,23979 
Total 67   ,5750 ,30680 
 
Table 3. The relation between the regulation index and the political system type 
Political System type N  Mean Std. Deviation 
Presidential 19 ,7064 ,20408 
Assembly-Elected President 1 ,5789 , 
Parliamentary 37 ,5846 ,33236 
Total 57 ,6251 ,29624 
 
 
   
In Table 1 the relation between regulation and electoral system type shows that majoritarian 
electoral system types do have less regulation than both proportional and mixed-electoral 
systems: measuring 0,41 and 0,612. In Table 2, means are compared to the political system 
type. A presidential political system has higher amount of regulation than a parliamentary and 
assembly-elected president.  
 
To illustrate the relationship between the variable of regulation and the amount of years that a 
country has been a democracy; the relationship between regulation and years of democracy is 
portrayed in a scatterplot, see Diagram 1. Considering the democratic context as an important 
variable for a country’s type of democratic institutional arrangement i.e. the amount of years a 
country have been free, doesn’t seems to be of significant value for the amount of regulations 
a country employ. Instead, what the scatter diagram seems to show is two distinctive waves of 
democratization that have occurred during the past 70 years, as stated by Ohman. Although, 
these different waves of democratization doesn’t show that the new democracies have more 
regulation. Instead, the amount of regulation differs greatly between both the new and the old 
democracies.  
 
 
Diagram 1. Relationship between amounts of regulation measured with an index and 
the number of years that a country has been a democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
5 Conclusion  
In this thesis a number of possible explanations that could explain the variation in source of 
money to political parties and the amount of regulation among party funding regimes have 
been researched. As a start it has concluded that the two indicators for party funding regimes, 
public funding and the regulation index, are positively correlated (H1).  This paper has tried 
to build and test hypotheses, derived from different areas of the political science, such as the 
electoral system, political system and the age of democratization, conducted with a large-n 
research design. The relation has demonstrated some interesting correlations with the concept 
of party funding regime and has provided some large strokes of generalizations, which has 
been in line with the framework that other scholars have started to build on in the search for 
the cause of variation. The variation in party funding regimes can be traced and can to some 
degree be explained by the factors used in this thesis. One important notification is that party-
funding reforms seems to be caused by the structure of the institutional system.  
What this paper has presented is that there are certain factors that, to some degree, 
determine the outcome of which type of ideal model of party funding regime that is created in 
a given country. Party funding regimes are in this thesis divided into two ideal models of how 
they vary in terms of public funding and regulation. Public funding and regulation is a trend 
that have been rising during the 20th century, while a big part of the democracies employ 
public funding and implement more regulation, a number of them doesn’t. This study has 
showed that the electoral system or more precisely: that democracies with a majoritarian 
electoral system are less prone to adopt public funding as a source of money to political 
parties. From the electoral system, we can make the conclusion that public funding seems to 
be dependent of the electoral system type, since a change from a majoritarian to a 
proportional system would decrease the likeliness that a country employ public funding. The 
results show that mixed -and proportional electoral system types also show a higher mean in 
amount of regulation than the majoritarian democratic counterparts, a result that is in line with 
the hypothesis that suggests that proportional systems employ public funding to a larger 
extent and implement more regulation (H2).  
The relationship between the executive and the legislative branches of government, 
whether a democracy have a presidential or parliamentary system, doesn’t show as strong 
correlation with party funding regimes as the electoral system type did. The presidential 
system type presents a weak positive correlation towards more public funding and more 
regulation than the parliamentary system, which still is in line with the hypothesis (H3). The 
argument made by Pinto-Duschinsky, that regulation in political finance many times where an 
effect of corruption scandals. In the light of this, Rose-Ackerman and Kunicova argued that 
these scandals where more likely to occur in proportional presidential systems types. These 
two theoretical arguments are then supported by this study; since this thesis argues that both 
parliamentary and presidential systems, apart, employ public funding and are more regulated 
than each systems type counterparts. 
 
 
   
 
The impact that the age of democracy has on the party funding regime appears to be dual. The 
relationship towards public funding seems to be positive: with less newly established 
democracies not using public funding as a source of funding. When it comes to regulation, the 
results is much more unclear. There is no relation between the age of democracy and the 
amount of regulation seen in the scatterplot, see Diagram 1. Even if more countries’ 
implement both public funding and regulation there is still a big variation both during the first 
wave of old democracies and as well as during the second wave of new democracies. What 
Van Biezen recognized in her research result, that new European democracies had more 
regulation, might not be true for new democracies in the world. Or, at least does it need 
further studies.  The last hypothesis show different results  (H4), since its true that public 
funding seems to be dependent on the age of democracy while the regulation doesn’t.  
 
5.1 Further Research 
The data from International IDEA on political finance gives new opportunities for cross-
national research with a large-n strategy, which haven’t been possible before. The emerging 
data will eventually be a collection of historical data that can contribute to further 
understanding and insight in changes over time. The conceptual framework portrayed in this 
paper has the opportunity to grow and incorporate different channels of sources of funding 
that is relatively unexplored: such as the impact of research agencies and think thanks in the 
political process and its impact on the outcomes of policy and funding patterns. There is also 
potential to focus on a narrow particular aspect of the conceptual framework for the purpose 
of go in-depth in certain questions in the data set. The statistical models in this thesis have 
been kept simple and further studies could therefor include more advanced statistical tests.
 The result does create more question on what impact the party competition has 
on the outcome of variation. Does party funding regimes with parliamentary electoral systems 
with a presidential form of government use public funding and have more regulation due to 
impact of the party system or are those systems more prone to corruption, which leads to 
funding reforms? Or what effect does a strong opposition have in a political system, is it more 
likely for reform when it is more possible for the party in office to agree on change when they 
could be out of office in the future?  
  Another field of research, in contrast to the established democracies, would be 
the emerging democracies. The typology and classifications are in most part shaped and 
measured after the western context, emerging democracies is therefor an interesting field by 
itself and could in comparison to the established democracies be facing completely different 
financial structures.  
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7 Appendix 1 
Freedom House - Freedom in the World 2013 – Democratic countries rated as “Free” 
 
Andorra 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada* 
Guyana* 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Kiribati* 
Latvia 
Lesotho 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritius 
Micronesia 
Monaco 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Northern Cyprus * 
Norway 
Palau 
Panama 
Peru 
Poland 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico * 
Romania 
Samoa 
San Marino 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and 
Grenadines* 
Suriname* 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago* 
Tuvalu 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Vanuatu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
